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Character was like a tree and reputation like its shadow.
2
The shadow is what we think of it; the tree was the real thing.

I. INTRODUCTION

R

eputation is an important and complex issue for individuals, communities and nations. Like a shadow, reputation reflects the characteristics of an individual with varying
degrees of precision. Reputation rarely provides a mirror image, rather, like a shadow, it is something that varies through
time and the changing position of the world. As an initial matter, reputation is defined as “the common or general estimate of
a person with respect to character or other qualities; the relative estimation or esteem in which a person or thing is held.”3
The notion behind reputation is that individuals receive information about the behavior of others from third parties; this information is then used to decide whether or not to behave in a
similar manner, and how to interact with the other person.4
Positive reputational information results in increased willingness to act cooperatively with the other person.5 As would be
expected, the opposite reaction occurs when individuals are
provided negative reputational information.6
Reputation is not a phenomenon confined to individuals;
states have reputations as well. Yet, the importance of a state’s
reputation goes beyond the “shadow” cast, for a state’s reputation has the potential to undermine the “tree” itself. The potential harm of reputation derives from the fact that state reputa2. Abraham Lincoln, quoted in ANTHONY GROSS, LINCOLN’S OWN STORIES
109 (1912).
3. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 678 (2d ed. 1980). It is noteworthy
that reputation is defined as an “estimate.” This concession within the definition of reputation—that it is not something that can be identified precisely—
presents a fundamental problem for reliance on reputation as a compliance
mechanism of international law: reputation, by its very definition, is imprecise. This imprecision can, and often does, lead to inaccuracies due to overestimation of positive or negative attributes.
4. Vincent Buskens, Social Networks and the Effect of Reputation on
Cooperation, Address for the Sixth International Conference on Social Dilemmas (March 30, 1998), available at http://www.fss.uu.nl/soc/iscore/papers/
paper042.pdf.
5. Id. See also Manfred Milinski et al., Reputation Helps Solve the “Tragedy of the Commons,” 415 NATURE 424, 424 (2002).
6. See Buskens, supra note 4.
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tion is an important and vital component in the smooth operation of international law. With few traditional legal mechanisms to ensure that states comply with international law, it is
arguable that reputation is an important, even crucial, mechanism for securing state compliance.7
Similar to the reputations of individuals, state reputations
can be highly inaccurate. State reputations may be flawed or
bear little resemblance to the actions of the states themselves,
creating “reputational fallacies.” In addition to concerns about
accuracy, issues specific to states exist that are not present
when examining the reputation of individuals. These statespecific issues tend to exacerbate reputational fallacies. A fundamental difference concerns the notion of state sovereignty.
Sovereignty presupposes that states are “masters of their own
domain” in all aspects—from governance to culture.8 Policies
based entirely on self-interest are not only permitted within the
world of state sovereignty, but are expected.9 Consequently, the

7. See, e.g., George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (2002); Andrew T. Guzman,
A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1849
(2002); Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT’L L.
545, 592 (2004); Steven R. Ratner, Overcoming Temptations to Violate Human
Dignity in Times of Crisis: On the Possibilities for Meaningful Self-Restraint, 5
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 81, 93–94 (2004). Note that while there are many
articles that discuss reputation within the context of state compliance, few
other articles, if any, explore actual states’ reputations and the lessons that
the international community may learn from increased scrutiny of state reputation.
8. See Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and
the Invisible Hand of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 178 (2001). While
this postulate of international law has slowly changed in the post-WWII era
as a result of developments in areas like human rights and modern communication technologies, sovereignty is still a fundamental basis of the international system. Id. at 179–82.
9. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
YALE L.J. 1935, 1938 (2002). Thus, Canadian action pursuing a World Trade
Organization (WTO) case in order to force Europe to accept shipments of asbestos, while considered reprehensible by the Europeans, and a blow to Canada’s reputation, was considered a sound action by the Canadians as it attempted to serve Canada’s interests. See Report of the WTO Appellate Body,
European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar.12, 2001) (Doc# 01-1157), 40
I.L.M. 1193 (2001), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/
wtoab/ec-asbestos(ab).pdf [hereinafter WTO Asbestos Report].
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nature of state sovereignty makes any examination of state
reputation more complex than that of individuals. Another issue is that reputation is inherently subjective and normative.
State reputations reflect the aggregate of individual subjective
perceptions of behavior via culturally-anchored criteria that
differ from state to state with varying societal goals, cultures,
values, and characteristics.10 This heightened level of subjectivity presents a problem when attempting to characterize behavior for determinations of whether or not a state is a good international actor. Each of these issues increases the complexity of
information used to inform reputational assessments and,
therefore, may exacerbate reputation’s inherent imprecision.
Reputational fallacies raise important issues for international
law. In particular, the utility of reputation as a compliance
mechanism, when reputation does not accurately reflect state
behavior, may impact the effectiveness of international law.
This Article will examine the problem of reputational fallacies
through a comparative examination of two states with very different reputations in the international trade arena: the United
States and Canada.11 The ensuing examination of U.S. and Canadian trade actions explores whether each state’s reputation is
logically connected to its actual behavior in the international
trade arena. This Article ultimately concludes that there is little substantive support for each state’s reputational difference.12
While this Article’s examination is confined to the trade actions
of the United States and Canada, it nonetheless suggests that
reputation—as a means of enforcing state compliance with international obligations—is, at best, an inaccurate tool of inter10. See, e.g., Doris Weidemann, Learning About “Face” – “Subjective Theories” as a Construct in Analysing Intercultural Learning Processes of Germans
in Taiwan, 2(3) F. QUALITATIVE SOC. RES. par. 4 (2001) (“[c]ulture standards…are inherently and inextricably relative….”), at http://www.qualitativeresearch.net/fqs-texte/3-01/3-01weidemann-e.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
11. An examination of U.S. and Canadian behavior in the entire realm of
international law or international relations would be a substantial undertaking and is better left for development within a book.
12. This Article assumes Canada’s positive reputation, but see note 40 and
accompanying text, then compares Canadian trade actions with those of the
United States—a state routinely vilified for its trade actions. This Article
does not seek to muddy the reputation of Canada, nor to improve that of the
United States, but, rather, it seeks to show that reputation is, at best, a difficult and intrinsically inaccurate tool of international law.

File: Picker Macro 122704.doc

72

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:25 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:26 PM

[Vol. 30:1

national law. In fact, this Article suggests that reputation, at
its worst, is harmful to international law compliance because it
introduces fallacies and inefficiencies, as well as a whole host of
other problems associated with its inherent inaccuracy.
Part II of this Article will briefly examine the concept of reputation and how it interacts with international law and international trade. It will also discuss some of the underlying problems associated with a comparative examination of reputation.
Part III of the Article will engage in an in-depth examination of
the reputations of two states, the United States and Canada, in
an effort to determine whether their international trade reputations have any basis in reality. The Article will then, in Part
IV, examine the utility of reputation in light of its likely inaccuracies, as well as seek to identify the actual sources of those
reputations. Finally, the Article will consider the consequences
of exposing reputational fallacies for the states involved as well
as for the international legal system.
II. REPUTATION
A. Reputation and International Law
Reputation, as a tool of international law compliance, remains one of the most intriguing concepts in international law.
Despite Professor Louis Henkin’s modern maxim that “almost
all nations observe almost all principles of international law
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time,”13 international law compliance is not clearly understood. Henkin’s
maxim, after all, begs the question of why states tend to comply
with international law.14 The traditional view is that state com13. See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47
(2d ed. 1979); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599 n.2 (1997) (collecting sources of empirical
research suggesting that Henkin’s maxim is correct).
14. Indeed, while it is common to claim that U.S. behavior within the international legal system shows that the United States does not respect or
comply with international law, the truth is that the United States, through its
officials, diplomats, soldiers, citizens and so on, obeys international law thousands of times each day — from customs compliance with international standards to the rules of engagement of soldiers in combat zones. A few high profile examples of non-compliance should not mar the otherwise stellar U.S.
record of international law compliance — this despite the fact that world attention will likely focus on the occasional example of U.S. conflict with inter-
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pliance results from a combination of factors—part carrot, part
stick.15
The carrots and sticks of state compliance, however, are directly linked to reputation. Specifically, several factors increase
state compliance with international law: fear of retaliation, concern that next time no one will want to “play” with the state, a
self-serving or altruistic interest in the successful operation and
legitimacy of the international legal system, and a desire to
avoid rogue-state status.16 Many of these factors have state
reputation at their core.17 States’ fears that others will not
“play” with them in the future is related to the fear that word
will get out that they are “rule breakers.” Similarly, concern for
a state’s image is, of course, a concern about reputation. The
interest of states, guided either by self-interest or idealism, in
the continuing vitality and legitimacy of the international legal
system is also related to reputation. Indeed, the existence of a
consistently disreputable state will naturally lead to questions
concerning the legitimacy of a legal system that allows such
flagrant rule-breaking and may cast doubt on the viability of
international law.
In addition to the traditional carrots and sticks, other features of international law can be directly linked to reputation.
New mechanisms to assist in the enforcement of international
law, such as the employment of binding adjudication and related authorized retaliations, are directly related to reputation.18 An offending state’s reputation likely influences other
national law and draw the inaccurate conclusion that the United States is
regularly non-compliant.
15. There is much debate as to why international law is followed, with
many reasons advanced. Examination of those reasons suggests that they
can, for the most part, be considered either as “carrots” (such as sharing in the
benefits of an effective international legal system) or as sticks (such as the
employment of sanctions by other parties against rule-breakers). See JOHN H.
JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 173 (4th ed. 2002) (lists several of the reasons
advanced for international law compliance).
16. See generally Hongju Koh, supra note 13 (providing a broad overview
and critique of the historical and modern theories of state compliance with
international law).
17. See Downs & Jones, supra note 7, at 99–100.
18. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE
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states or international organizations when they decide to take
the extreme step of instituting procedures that lead to retaliation. Resorting to international proceedings, an unusual step in
the generally diplomatic world of international law, may be
thought necessary to force a disreputable state with a reputation for showing disregard for its obligations under international legal system into compliance.19 Hence, both traditional
factors and modern enforcement mechanisms that ensure state
compliance with international law are related, in some respects,
to reputation.
Just as reputation is a vital component of international law
enforcement, inaccurate reputation may cause significant harm
to the efficient operation of the international legal system. For
example, state reputation can impact international adjudication
and negotiations.20 With respect to international adjudication,
inaccurate reputation may cloud the integrity of claims and of
evidence and testimony. It may undermine a state’s ability to
rely on good faith and equitable defenses.21 Inaccuracy may also
reduce the incidence of support from other states, and could
encourage other states to join the opposition either directly or

URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S.
354, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding].
19. Thus, when creating the WTO, the world trade system purposely
moved away from the traditional diplomatic dispute resolution employed in
the GATT in order to enforce compliance where the previous diplomatic system had frequently failed. See, e.g., Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization, 2 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 403, 407 (2001). There may also be a feeling that it is time to teach such a
disreputable state a “lesson” so as to encourage future compliance of its other
international legal obligations. See John E. Noyes, The Functions of Compromissory Clauses in U.S. Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 831, 835–38 (1994).
20. See infra Part III.A.–B.
21. Cf. Reena Sengupta, A Contest of Reputations: Media Strategy: Public
Relations Can Be as Important as a Sound Legal Case, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 16, 2004, at 11 (negative impressions created by a lawsuit against corporate entities have significant impact upon corporate reputation and shareholder value; according to University of Chicago study, winning the case will
do little to reverse the damage to reputation); Peter Nicolas, American–Style
Justice in No Man’s Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 896, 955 (2002) (“If tribes earn a
reputation for dishonoring contracts and then invoking the defense of sovereign immunity when sued in contract, it will impact their business reputation,
and those contracting with them will either demand a contractual waiver of
sovereign immunity or a higher contract price.”).
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through some form of amicus curiae briefs.22 This issue is accentuated when two opposing states represent different ends of
the reputational continuum.23 Detrimental reputational inaccuracies may be reflected in international negotiation as an inability of a state to have its negotiation positions accepted or supported.24 A state’s offers of concessions are mistrusted and/or
discounted and may be rejected absent some form of guaranty
or binding adjudication.25 Put simply, states operating under a

22. This claim is hard to prove, for rarely do states claim such activities as
a consequence of reputation. However, the recent World Court Advisory case
concerning Israel provides some support for this assertion. Forty-seven nonparty states made submissions in the case; it is reasonable to assume that
Israel’s reputation was part of the motivation for the overwhelming international response. See International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, July 9, 2004, 43
I.L.M. 1009 (2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imw
p/imwp_advisory_opinion/. Additionally, and perhaps a bit cynically, it would
not be surprising if reputation affects arbitrators or judges, hence impacting
their decisions to some extent—they are, after all, human. While this Article
makes no pronouncement on the merit of the claim, World Court Judge
Schwebel’s vigorous dissent in Nicaragua v. United States could be interpreted to suggest that perhaps such phenomena was present in the minds of
the judges in the majority opinion. See Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 266 (June 27). Thus, a state with a negative
reputation will be operating under a handicap and will have a tougher time
prevailing during adjudication. In contrast, a state with a good reputation
will more likely have each of the factors above working to their benefit: having
their testimony and evidence accorded greater weight, enjoying the support of
other states in their adjudications, and receiving the benefit of the doubt from
judges and arbitrators.
23. As an example, were North Korea (generally considered to be a rogue
state) to be involved in a dispute with Finland (generally considered to be a
law-abiding state) it would be surprising if their respective reputations did
not play a role in the process. Intuitively, I believe this occurs in Canadian–
U.S. trade adjudication, at least to some extent; however, proving such an
assertion would be very difficult.
24. This is also hard to show as states will rarely characterize rejection of a
position due to reputation, but it is likely that the position of the United
States in international negotiations suffers as a consequence of its reputation.
25. Cf. Nicolas, supra note 21, at 955 (describing how reputation for claiming immunity from contractual obligations via a sovereign immunity defense
may result in other parties being unwilling to contract with Native Americans).
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reputational cloud will simply have a harder time achieving
their negotiation goals.26
Accordingly, there are significant costs to reputation. Where
state reputation is not accurate, as with the international trade
reputations of the United States and Canada, reputational costs
are borne without legitimate reason.27 Invalid reputational
costs, at best, are an inefficient tool of international relations,
and, at worst, a powerfully destructive element in the development and maintenance of the international legal system. However, despite this danger, it must be re-emphasized that reputation is integral to the operation of international law. Thus, disavowing reputation as a compliance mechanism would likely
have dramatic consequences for the continuing viability of international law. Therefore, this Article posits that reputation
be examined within the context of international law and state
behavior and resultant problems be resolved so that reputation
may continue to be employed in international law. Reputation
should be exposed for what it often is—an inaccurate and harmful tool of international law—and corrected through examination and exposure. Accordingly, this Article’s attempt to make
the issue of reputation more transparent should contribute to a
greater understanding and more accurate use of reputation in
international law, thereby contributing to the continuing viability and development of the international system.
B. Comparative Reputational Analysis
A brief discussion of the pitfalls of comparative analysis in
the international reputation context is merited before beginning
the process of comparing the United States and Canada. Comparative analysis is always fraught with difficulties.28 The variables and differences among states can simply be too qualitatively and quantitatively difficult to allow for accurate comparison. Most notably, failure to take both legal and societal cul-

26. The special trade rules applied to China as a condition of its membership in the WTO may be described as of this variety, particularly the dumping
and subsidies rules. See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China’s
WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469, 1514 (2000).
27. See infra Part IV.B.2.
28. See John H. Langbein, Judging Foreign Judges Badly: Nose-Counting
Isn’t Enough, 18 JUDGES J. 4, 50 (1979).
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ture into account can result in a discontinuity between the asserted comparisons and the realities of the states and areas of
study.29 With respect to reputation, where legal and societal
cultures play such prominent roles, a comparative analysis may
be especially vulnerable.30
As an initial point, certain differences between the two countries are apparent.31 Indeed, the Canadian economy is radically
29. Id.
30. When there is an effort to draw broad international law lessons from
an examination of a specific subset of international law, one would be remiss
not to take into account the problems inherent in a comparative analysis
across legal disciplines. Accordingly, it should be pointed out that this is a
comparative analysis within the world of international trade. While international trade is a vital and highly dynamic part of the international legal system, it is also significantly different from many of the other fields within international law. This dynamism can clearly be seen in the vast scope and
number of international economic law agreements negotiated in recent decades, including hundreds of regional trade agreements, bilateral investment
treaties, and multilateral agreements such as the WTO. Indeed, WTO membership is starting to rival that of the United Nations—the WTO has gained
147 members and 31 observer/applicant members since it was created almost
10 years ago, compared with the 191 members of the UN. See WTO website at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm; UN website at
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html.
Furthermore, resort to the
WTO’s dispute settlement body has produced a significant volume of decisions, easily rivaling that of the International Court of Justice. Over 300
cases have been filed with the WTO since 1995; comparatively, just over 100
contentious cases and 25 advisory opinions have come before the World Court
since 1947. See WTO website at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dis
pu_e/dispu_status_e.htm; World Court website at http://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/idecisions.htm. Additionally, international economic law has strong
institutions, including unusually strong (for international law) mechanisms to
encourage state compliance. See, e.g., WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 18, arts. 16, 17.14. Flowing through international trade—and
in constant tension with the public international law component of international trade—is economic theory and its emphasis on market forces. Potentially, the role of economics in the field of international trade law could result
in the reduction of the role of traditional norms of international law for international trade law, and their continuing replacement with economic values
applied to state-to-state interactions. This difference between international
trade/economic law and traditional public international law should be kept in
mind throughout the Article.
31. This is a case of comparing apples and oranges. But like apples and
oranges, while certain external appearances may suggest radical differences
between them, they are in fact essentially the same thing — two pieces of
fruit. See Scott A. Sanford, Apples and Oranges: A Comparison, in THE BEST
OF ANNALS OF IMPROBABLE RESEARCH 93 (Marc Abrahams ed., 1998) (finding
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different from that of the United States. For example, Canada
imports and exports the vast bulk of its trade with just one
country—the United States.32 Additionally, Canada has a continuous history of being heavily resource-dependent in its
trade.33 In contrast, U.S. trade is more widely diversified.34 In
addition, each state’s constitutional framework includes significant differences which impact their trade regimes and actions.35
Thus, this Article will not seek to show that these two states
are identical. Rather, this Article simply illustrates that there
are important similarities between the United States and Canada, without endeavoring to ascertain the reasons for those
similarities or to engage in a highly detailed comparative examination of subtle underlying differences. A broad and general finding of comparability between the two states is sufficient
for the purpose of this Article’s thesis.36 Having laid out the pitfalls and problems inherent in a comparative analysis, there is
still a tremendous benefit to such examinations derived from
lessons and problems highlighted in context rather than in isolation. Therefore, while the conclusions that flow from comparative analysis may be susceptible to attack, the benefits will
frequently outweigh otherwise valid concerns.
III. AN EXAMPLE OF DISPARATE REPUTATIONS: CANADA, THE
UNITED STATES, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
This section of the Article will compare the trade actions of
Canada and the United States against the backdrop of their
reputations in international trade.37 To begin, Canada is adthat in fact when scientifically compared, “apples and oranges are very similar.”), available at http://www.improbable.com/airchives/paperair/volume
1/v1i3/air-1-3-apples.html
32. THE ECONOMIST, POCKET WORLD IN FIGURES 121 (2003).
33. Id. at 120–21. See infra Part III.B.1.
34. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 223. See infra Part III.B.1.
35. See infra Part III.A.
36. But such a finding must nonetheless be grounded on an understanding
of the problems inherent in comparative analysis, or the findings will themselves be less persuasive.
37. Before starting what may be viewed as an attack on Canada, which it
certainly is not, I feel compelled to note that I admire and respect Canada. I
have enjoyed frequent visits to Canada and have traveled all over the country,
from Nova Scotia to Whitehorse in the Yukon Territory. I believe Canada,
like the United States, to be a wonderful country.
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mired the world over.38 Indeed, Canada’s reputation among
other states is as positive as the United States’ is negative.39
This is as true in international law as in all other areas of their
foreign policies. The question, then, is whether this reputational disparity accurately reflects the behavior and policies of
the two neighbors. Comparative examination of such a complex
question for all aspects of international law would be too complex and lengthy for this Article; hence, this Article will narrow
its focus to the reputational disparity between the United
States and Canada within international trade.40 Accordingly, as
the initial step in showing that reputation is a problematic device for controlling states, this Article will show the absence of a
legitimate basis for the difference in these two states’ international trade reputations.
This Article does not endeavor to show that the United States
is a good actor or that Canada is a bad actor. Rather, the aim of
this analysis is to show that Canada has engaged in behavior
markedly similar to that of the United States—employing a
healthy mixture of altruistic measures contrasted with some
negative actions best explained as part of the routine behavior
of states in protecting their self-interest.41 Thus, Canada’s and
the United States’s disparate reputations will be shown as having little foundation in reality.
The following analysis will identify several aspects of U.S.
trade policy that are heavily criticized, and then identify similar
38. See, e.g., Michael Doyon, Letter, Stop Playing Games with Iran,
TORONTO STAR, Aug. 2, 2004, at A19; Bill Redekop, International Trade Group
Optimistic on Prairie Berry, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, July 21, 2004, at A5;
Robert Colapinto, The Clean-Up Act, CA MAG., May 1, 2004, at 20; compare
with Press Release, Bob Menendez Calls on State Department, Federal
Document Clearing House (Aug. 20, 2004), available at 2004 WL 62027829;
Robert Robb, Kerry Can Imagine But He’s Just a Dreamer, ARIZONA REPUBLIC,
Aug. 1, 2004, at V1.
39. See infra Part III.
40. As noted before, reputation is hard to measure and prove empirically.
My “gut reaction” is that Canada’s reputation is better. However, the impression of one academic does not prove much. Accordingly, I interviewed international trade practitioners from the various states’ trade bars, academia, and
from the trade offices of Canada and the United States. Their impressions
substantially accorded with mine.
41. See, e.g., WTO Asbestos Report, supra note 9 (complaint by Canada,
with Brazil and the United States as Third Party Participants, attempting to
force the sale of asbestos onto the European market).

File: Picker Macro 122704.doc

80

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:25 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:26 PM

[Vol. 30:1

or comparable Canadian actions. For U.S. trade policy, the
primary issues examined are:
a. International Trade Negotiations42
b. Trade Dispute Adjudication43
c. Protectionism 44
d. Trade Distorting Regional Agreements45
e. Contentious Trade Issues46
f. Sanctions and Embargoes47
Although there are other concerns integral to the examination
of U.S. trade policy, these six are generally considered of primary importance.
After reviewing U.S. trade policy, the analysis focuses upon
Canadian trade policy in an effort to discern whether Canada
has engaged in similar or comparable behavior without incurring a reputational impact equivalent to that of the United
States. Indeed, an examination of the trade policy issues in the
previous paragraph will show that while Canada’s actions may
not be as “egregious” as the United States in some areas,48 Canada is just as culpable in several others.49 Beyond some level of
culpability, Canada also exemplifies behaviors that are directly
comparable to U.S. policy, yet all without the large reputational
cost borne by the United States.50 The following section explores each trade policy issue in detail and identifies behaviors

42. For example, the United States is considered a difficult state with
which to negotiate trade agreements. See infra Part III.A.
43. Including what issues the United States considers worth fighting over,
how often the U.S. is labeled a “rule-breaker,” and the aggressiveness of the
U.S. in pursuing trade adjudication with other states. See infra Part III.B.
44. For example, the United States is thought to employ excessive domestic protectionism—ranging from agricultural subsidies and application of
dumping and countervailing duty laws to the aggressive use of unilateral
trade sanctions. See infra Part III.C.
45. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
46. In particular, the use of international trade law to advance U.S. selfinterests in such fields as genetically modified food, hormone additives, and
widespread use of antibiotics in its livestock. See infra Part III.D.
47. The United States has used international trade law to further such
“non-trade” issues as national security, labor rights, the environment, and
human rights. See infra Part III.D.
48. See infra Part III.C.–D.
49. See infra Part III.C.–D.
50. See infra Part III.D.
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and actions by Canada that are often comparable to the United
States.
A. International Trade Negotiation
International trade agreements tend to follow a pattern.
Stage one is trade negotiations. Negotiations are then followed
by formal agreements with which states are expected to comply,
with non-compliance resulting in interstate disputes which may
be concluded through various dispute resolution mechanisms.51
Thus, it is only fitting that the comparison between the United
States and Canada begin where trade law begins, with an examination of the states’ negotiating characteristics.
The U.S. constitutional structure makes it difficult for the
United States to negotiate trade agreements. The constitutional requirement of separation of powers gives Congress certain powers over international trade, while giving other powers
to the Executive branch.52 The problems inherent in dividing
power over international trade are exacerbated by the constant
congressional and presidential election cycles.53 Furthermore,
Congressional participation in the development of trade agreements has historically been fraught with difficulty. The last
time Congress engaged in detailed trade legislation, resulting in
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, the log-rolling and pork
barrel politics encompassed within the legislation had devastat-

51. See, e.g., WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 18; Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 118, 1883 U.N.T.S. 3, 65–66;
see generally UN Office of Legal Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of
the Sea, Oceans and Law of the Sea (providing a brief synopsis of bodies established by the convention and alternatives for settlement of disputes), at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
52. Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and to “pass bills for raising revenue,” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 7, cl. 1, while that of the President is to “make treaties,” U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and generally take charge of foreign affairs. See generally
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (stating that
decisions regarding international affairs are vested in the President).
53. See, e.g., John H. Knox, NAFTA’s Environmental Provisions: What
Problems Were They Intended to Address?, 23 CAN.–U.S. L.J. 403 (1997); C.
O’Neal–Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the
NAFTA Turned Into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 10 n.35
(1994).
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ing effects upon the world trading system during the 1930s.54
Compounding the problem, Congressional action sometimes
suggests mistrust of the Executive branch, including Congress’s
refusal to fully support executive deals negotiated without its
approval.55 This lack of trust necessitated Fast Track and the
later Trade Promotion Authority,56 itself a political “hot potato.”57 Understandably, states are loath to negotiate with the
United States under these circumstances. Despite these problems, states do nonetheless negotiate with the United States.
Indeed, given the role of the U.S. economy in the world, it would
be nearly impossible for states to avoid dealing with the United
States.58 Hence, despite the impediments, the United States
has been a major player in the development of the world trading
system.
Just as the United States has been integral to the development of the international trade regime, Canada has also played

54. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (enumerating a very lengthy list of materials and goods subject to tariffs); Brady P.
Priest, Steel Tariffs: A Shining Example of the Tension Between Politics and
Economics in the United States Today, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1025, 1035
(2003).
55. As exemplified in the confrontation over the results of the Kennedy
Round (Final Act Embodying the Results of the 1964-67 Trade Conference,
B.I.S.D. (15th Supp.) at 4 (1968) (consisting of multilateral negotiations
against dumping practices)). See Renegotiations Amendment Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-634, § 201, 82 Stat. 1345, 1347 (1968) (declaring that the Antidumping Act of 1921 still retains primacy over agreements entered into by the
President during the Kennedy Round); S. REP. NO. 89-1341, at 3 (2d Sess.
1966) (expressing the Finance Committee’s concern that the Executive Branch
has not been vested with authority to engage in international trade agreements within the Kennedy Round of negotiations, especially as the unfair
trade practices involved have effects in the domestic economy, an area within
legislative control).
56. See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §3801
(2002); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
57. See generally Laura L. Wright, Note, Trade Promotion Authority: Fast
Track for the Twenty-First Century?, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 979 (2004)
(describing the history of Fast Track and the continuing legislative restrictions of the Executive’s ability to unilaterally make trade agreements).
58. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 24, 32 (the United States has
the largest GDP in the world and ranks first for total world exports (accounting for just over 15% of all global exports)).
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a significant role in international trade negotiations.59 The formation of the ground-breaking Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement60 (CUSFTA) was crucial in the development of the World
Trade Organization (WTO).61 Thus, it was no surprise that
Canada played a key role during the Uruguay Round negotiations that resulted in the international community adopting a
new trade system to replace the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).62 While receiving help, it was Canadian
trade negotiators who developed the contours of the system that
was to become the WTO, including being the first to coin the
name.63 In other words, even though anti-globalization protesters often describe the WTO as a U.S.-created monster, fair attribution, for whatever one believes about the WTO, should also
go to Canada.
Regardless of these negotiation successes, Canada, like the
United States, can be a difficult negotiating party.64 Just as
with the United States, Canada’s constitutional structure
makes international trade negotiations difficult. Canada’s Constitution provides the provinces with a joint role in certain foreign relations issues, including trade.65 Specifically, Canadian
59. George Anderson, Canadian Federalism and Foreign Policy, 27 CANU.S. L.J. 45, 46 (2001); see also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
45 (2d ed. 1997).
60. MICHAEL HART, A TRADING NATION 372–93 (2002).
61. See, e.g., id. at 411. The negotiation and development of the CUSFTA,
with its broad coverage and binding dispute settlement mechanisms, showed
that international trade agreements could provide greater coverage than that
provided by the GATT. Id.
62. Canada, along with the European Union, was instrumental in the proposal and acceptance of the idea of using the Uruguay Round to establish a
new trade system to replace GATT. Id. See also Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,
1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994), 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994).
63. JACKSON, supra note 59, at 45.
64. See HART, supra note 60, at 193, 447 (presenting the view that Canadian negotiators were “chiselers” who would “seek[ ] much and giv[e] little” in
GATT negotiations).
65. Carl Grenier, States, Provinces, and Cross-Border International Trade,
26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 175 (2000). This is a consequence of the fact that the Canadian constitutional grant of trade authority to the Canadian federal government was originally interpreted narrowly by the Privy Council in London, and
later by the Canadian Supreme Court. See Att’y Gen. of Can. v. Att’y Gen. of
Ontario (Labour Conventions Case), [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673, 682; see also Patrick
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provinces have significant authority over internal trade issues.
Consequently, where international trade rules have an impact
domestically, the federal government must work with the provincial government to assure provincial assent via provincial
legislation.66 This was an issue in the implementation of the
CUSFTA67 and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA),68 and could be problematic in the future if public or
provincial attitudes move away from supporting free trade.69
Thus, constitutional federalism issues play a major role in Canada’s participation in the world trade environment.70
Constitutional divisions are not the only problem facing negotiators on both sides of the border; ratification and implementation of trade agreements are also problematic. Difficulties ratifying and implementing international trade agreements are
well known. U.S. Congressional battles over NAFTA and the
WTO and Trade Promotion Authority (previously known as
Fast Track)71 received considerable world attention.72 Yet, Canada has had problems delivering ratification and implementation of international trade agreements as well. For example,
the Mulroney government’s73 successful and arduous negotiation

Monahan, Canadian Federalism and its Impact on Cross-Border Trade, 27
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 19 (2001).
66. Att’y Gen. of Can., [1937] 1 D.L.R. at 683.
67. HART, supra note 60, at 388–90.
68. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can.,
107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993), available at http://www.world
tradelaw.net/dsc/searchmain/searchreports.htm [hereinafter NAFTA].
69. Anderson, supra note 59, at 49–50.
70. A related problem arises when the federal government uses international trade regulation for actions that would not be allowed under domestic
regulation in that such actions may be perceived as discrimination against
foreign parties. The result is inadvertent protectionism, but in truth the government’s actions are a consequence of the Canadian constitutional division of
powers between the federal and provincial governments. For an example of
inadvertent protectionism, see Ethyl Corp. v. Can. (Award on Jurisdiction), 38
I.L.M. 708 (NAFTA Art. 11 Arbitral Tribunal 1999).
71. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act § 2101.
72. See generally O’Neal–Taylor, supra note 53, at 18 n. 67 (Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (repealed 1975)). See also
Samuel C. Straight, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, 220 (1995).
73. Brian Mulroney served as Canada’s prime minister between September
17, 1984 and June 13, 1993. For a description of Mulroney’s government’s
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of the CUSFTA was followed by a very tempestuous and uncertain implementation battle.74 The contentious implementation
threatened to change the balance of power in the Canadian Parliament as well as endanger the Prime Minister’s position.75
Therefore, despite international focus upon U.S. ratification and
implementation battles, both states have struggled with the
issue.
Finally, the United States has been increasingly criticized for
moving away from the multilateral trade development policy
exemplified by the WTO and focusing too much energy on bilateral or regional trade agreements.76 The time, energy and resources expended by the United States on bilateral free trade
agreements also detract from the ability and focus of the United
States in multilateral negotiations, to the detriment of the
WTO’s present round of negotiations.77 Additionally, while
these agreements are beneficial to the parties involved, they
have received tremendous criticism as trade-distorting meas-

policies after he took office, especially in relation to the United States, see
HART, supra note 60, at 372–75.
74. Id. at 389.
75. Following the signing of the Agreement and introduction and implementation of legislation in 1988, the Mulroney government was forced by the
Liberal opposition in the Canadian Senate to call an election, the main issue
being the implementation of the trade agreement. Id. Nor was it assured
that Mulroney would emerge victorious, and, indeed, the popular vote was
split on the issue. Id. However, with its “first past the post” election system,
the Conservatives actually won the majority needed to force the bill through
and the trade agreement with the United States received the Canadian implementing legislation it needed. Id.
76. See Colin B. Picker, A Time to Fight Back: Ending the Abuse of Article
XXIV (paper accepted for delivery at International Conference: The WTO at a
Crossroads (13-14 December 2004, Faculty of Law, Bar Ilan University, Israel)), available at http://www.biu.ac.il/LAW/wto_conference_draft.htm (last
visited Oct. 9, 2004). The United States currently has bilateral or regional
trade agreements with Israel, Jordan, Canada, Mexico, Singapore, and Chile.
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS, at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/Section_
Index.html. In addition, there are ongoing negotiations with the rest of the
Americas as part of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), as well as
with Australia, Morocco, Panama, Central America and the Southern African
Customs Union. Id.
77. See Picker, supra note 76 (citing comparative ease of negotiating regional trade agreements as a factor in states’ preference over more timeconsuming multilateral agreements).
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ures. For example, it is more likely that a product will trade
between two states when there is a free trade agreement, even
if the most efficient supplier would be another state outside of
the agreement.78
Canada has similarly placed substantial focus upon development of numerous bilateral and regional trade agreements.79
Specifically, Canada is involved with NAFTA and bilateral
agreements with Israel, Chile and Costa Rica.80 In addition,
like the United States, there are also ongoing Canadian negotiations with Singapore, the European Free Trade Association,
the Central America Four, and as part of the FTAA.81
Furthermore, the proliferation of regional trade agreements
can result in a different sort of harm to the international trade
system — an institutional harm.82 Institutional harm occurs
when countries resort to bilateral or regional agreements rather
than multilateral agreements, resulting in the expenditure of
significantly more of a country’s limited negotiating resources
on regional agreements than on the ongoing WTO negotiations.
Specifically, without strong commitment to the multilateral
trade system—such as that provided in the early nineties by
Canada in the development of the WTO—the WTO’s development will likely stagnate as countries achieve their trade goals
through regional trade agreements.83 Canada’s expenditure of
its limited resources and time on bilateral and regional negotiations has an increased potential to hamper continuing develop78. See Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J.
419, 432 (2001) (discussing the effects on trade regionalism when an economically superior country enters into a bilateral agreement with an economically
inferior one).
79. See WTO Secretariat, World Trade Organization, WTO Trade Policy
Review of Canada, WT/TPR/S/112/Rev.1 (March 19, 2003), at 21–25, available
at http://docsonline.wto.org [hereinafter WTO Trade Policy Review].
80. See NAFTA, supra note 68, pmbl. (regarding Canadian involvement);
See Alberta Government, Free Trade and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) (regarding Canadian bilateral agreements), available at http://
www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/psc5097?opendocument
(last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
81. International Trade Canada, Regional and Bilateral Initiatives, at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/reg-en.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
82. Picker, supra note 76. This novel concept is developed in a presentation by the author with likely publication.
83. JACKSON, supra note 59, at 45.
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ment of the WTO because these negotiations divert a large portion of the country’s limited negotiation resources away from
the multilateral trade system. In comparison, the United
States’ much larger office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) affords the United States the ability to engage in
regional trade agreement negotiations to a significantly greater
extent than smaller or less populated states like Canada.84
As shown, the relative harm of regional trade agreement negotiations on the world’s multilateral trading system, the WTO,
is therefore likely to be greater when a state like Canada expends its limited negotiating resources on them. In the end,
while the United States is castigated as a problematic negotiating partner, examination of Canada’s negotiating characteristics shows it also has problems negotiating and delivering domestic assent to international trade agreements and with
squandering scarce negotiating resources.
B. International Trade Adjudication
A state’s reputation is often shaped by its participation in international adjudication, either through the defense of state
actions and legislation or through the aggressiveness with
which a state seeks to have its international rights protected.
Despite the fact that state-to-state dispute resolution is still the
exception in foreign affairs, sometimes states choose to bring a
case against another state.85 Diplomatic resolutions are the preferred state-to-state dispute resolution mechanism.86 Regardless, the modern international trade regimes of the WTO and
NAFTA, in contrast to the prior GATT regime, provide for binding state-to-state adjudication.87 Most revolutionary of all, adjudication under modern trade regimes permits sanctions to

84. The actual discretionary appropriation of the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative in 2002 was $30 million; the estimated appropriation for 2004
was $37 million. U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT: FED. FUNDS, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/
fy04/sheets/fpaa_21.xls (last visited Aug. 26, 2004).
85. Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 405, 411 (2003).
86. See id.
87. WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 18; NAFTA, supra note 68, ch. 20.
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bring states into compliance.88 Hence, these disputes provide a
prime opportunity for formation of state reputations. The reputations resulting from trade adjudication can reflect (i) a state’s
aggressiveness, (ii) how often its behavior either violates or appears to violate trade rules and, (iii) those actions a state is
willing to go to “court” to defend. Accordingly, a comparison of
U.S. and Canadian adjudications, from all three perspectives,
may help identify similarities and differences that explain the
differences and inaccuracies in reputations or help show that
their reputations are inaccurate.
1. Aggressiveness
The frequency with which states resort to litigation reveals
much about their aggressiveness. Traditionally, countries resolve issues behind closed doors through diplomatic channels.89
Taking the unusual step of filing a case against another country
is a particularly aggressive action for a state. An examination
of the number of cases filed by each country can be used to ascertain a state’s aggressiveness. Using the number of cases
filed by individual states may be an imperfect measurement of
aggressiveness,90 yet it provides a useful tool in comparing the
United States and Canada and assessing whether they deserve
their respective reputations.

88. See, e.g., WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 18.
89. Alvarez, supra note 85, at 411.
90. Examination of the number of cases filed by a country can be a troubling and crude indicator because it involves a “moving target”—i.e., cases and
disputes are not static. Furthermore, there may be plenty of disputes that go
unreported in which other aggressive pressures are brought to bear but where
a complaint is ultimately not filed. See Amelia Porges, Settling WTO Disputes: What Do Litigation Models Tell Us?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
141, 156 (2003). However, those details are not publicly available and hence
will not have as large an impact on the reputation of a state as those that are
more widely known to the public. A further problem with examining cases
filed in an effort to get at reputation is that the filing of complaints may be
limited by the capacity of the legal staff responsible for such cases. Neither
the USTR nor the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade have unlimited resources to take on cases. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 84. However, staff size in itself reflects the aggressiveness of the
state, and so the limitation is itself a component in the formation of the reputation.
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It is unsurprising that the United States has filed more cases
than Canada, as its economy is greater and more diversified. In
2000, the Canadian GDP was $688 billion, while the U.S. GDP
was nearly ten trillion dollars.91 The U.S. economy is over fourteen times the size of Canada’s.92 This alone suggests that the
United States would have to file fourteen times more cases than
Canada for the two to be comparable. Examining the actual
number of the cases is quite revealing. As of January, 2004, the
United States had filed seventy-three complaints with the
WTO,93 while Canada had filed twenty-five.94 The United
States has filed only three times as many cases as Canada.
Thus, the United States has filed considerably fewer cases than
would be expected considering the size of its economy.
Perhaps, however, a more relevant economic measurement
for the purposes of this Article is the relative international
trade figures. As an initial matter, it is important to note that
Canada’s economy is heavily weighted to trade with the United
States.95 With respect to trade in goods, Canada exports over
85% to and imports almost 74% of its trade from the United
States; the United States exports approximately 23% of its
trade to and imports 19% from Canada.96 However, looking at
the total world trade figures is merely a starting point. In 2000,
the United States had 15.44% of the total world exports, while
Canada had 3.81%.97 In the same year, the United States imported $1.2 trillion and exported $781.9 billion (approximately
$2 trillion in total trade), while Canada imported $244.6 billion
and exported $284.6 billion ($529.2 billion in total trade).98
91. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 121,122.
92. Id.
93. See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlements: The Disputes,
Disputes Chronologically, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
dispu_status_e.htm#2004 (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) [hereinafter WTO Dispute
Settlement website]; See also UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
SNAPSHOT OF WTO CASES INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES (updated Sept. 2,
2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring
_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/asset_upload_file84_5696.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter SNAPSHOT OF WTO CASES].
94. See WTO Dispute Settlement website, supra note 93.
95. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 121.
96. Id. at 121, 223.
97. Id. at 32.
98. Id. at 121, 223.
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Thus, the U.S. aggregate international trade in goods is about
four times greater than Canada’s. However, given that the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding covers trade in services as well as goods, inclusion of trade in services is pertinent
to the analysis. Canada’s trade in services in 2003 was $87 billion.99 The United States traded $500 billion worth of services
in 2003.100 Thus, total trade in goods and services for the United
States is approximately $2.5 trillion and for Canada is $616.2
billion. Therefore, we should expect the United States to have
filed roughly four times the number of cases as Canada. However, despite Canada’s reputation, the analysis below shows
that reality is at variance with expectation.
As previously noted, the United States has filed seventy-three
complaints with the WTO101 and Canada has filed twenty-five.102
The United States has filed fewer than three times the cases
Canada has filed. These figures are essentially consistent with
the differing sizes of the two economies. Yet, an even greater
differential between the number of WTO cases brought by Canada versus the United States should be expected. This is because the bulk of Canada’s trade is with one state and takes
place under the auspices of NAFTA rather than the WTO. Accordingly, many of the disputes will not make it to the WTO’s
dispute settlement institutions but, rather, will be resolved under NAFTA’s dispute mechanisms.103 Furthermore, because
99. See Trade and Trade Policy Development, Recent Trends in International Trade and Policy Developments, in WORLD TRADE REPORT 2004, at 20
(2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres04_e/press378_
annex_e.pdf ($39 billion in exports, $48 billion in imports).
100. Id. ($282 billion in exports, $218 billion in imports).
101. See SNAPSHOT OF WTO CASES, supra note 93.
102. See International Trade Canada, Trade Negotiations and Agreement,
Dispute Settlement, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/dispute-en.asp
(last visited Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Canada Dispute Settlement].
103. The NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism comprises a sequence of
government-to-government consultations, meetings of the NAFTA Free-Trade
Commission, establishment of an arbitral panel under Chapter 20, arbitral
measures governed by Chapter 11, binding panel reviews of final antidumping
and countervailing duty determinations, and an Extraordinary Challenge
Committee procedure under Chapter 19. For a summary of the dispute settlement mechanisms, see NAFTA SECRETARIAT, OVERVIEW OF THE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS OF NAFTA, at http://nafta-sec-alena.org/Default
Site/dispute/index_e.aspx?ArticleID=8 (last modified May 10, 2004). See
NAFTA, supra note 68.
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Canada has a single primary trade destination, it would seem
likely that trade tensions would be reduced due to familiarity
and alternative avenues for dispute resolution (such as lobbying).104
When these factors are taken into account, one would expect
Canada to have filed fewer cases with the WTO than it has.
With the relative information in mind, the WTO figures support
the view that both states are similarly litigious and, accordingly, similarly aggressive. Indeed, one could argue that Canada is the more aggressive state because its reputation suggests
it would file fewer cases.105 This strongly supports the view that
the reputations of the United States and Canada are not consistent with reality.
2. Rule-Breaking
While complaints filed by the United States and Canada may
reflect how aggressively each state protects its interests, being
named as a defendant in an international trade dispute may
reflect perceptions of rule-breaking.106 To date, eighty-two complaints have been filed against the United States.107 Of the
thirty-eight concluded so far, the United States has prevailed in
four,108 twelve were resolved without adjudication, and the rest
are in process.109 Canada, in contrast, has only been a defen-

104. See generally GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION (2003) (describing the relationship
of government and industry lobbyists in instituting, prosecuting and derailing
trade cases and tensions with foreign companies and countries).
105. The perception that Canada is less aggressively litigious is based upon
my interviews of trade practitioners and policymakers, see supra text accompanying note 40.
106. Cf. Sengupta, supra note 21 (describing the potentially irrecoverable
reputational impact upon corporations when they are named as defendants in
lawsuits).
107. SNAPSHOT OF WTO CASES, supra note 93.
108. Id. The United States has won on core issues in the following ten
cases: Sections 301-310 of Trade Act of 1974 (EU); “Shrimp–Turtle” law (India, et al.) (compliance proceedings); CVD regulations (Canada); AD–steel
plate (India); CVD–German steel (EU); Section 129(c)(1) URAA (Canada);
Rules of origin–textiles and apparel products (India); AD–sunset review (Japan); CVD–softwood lumber (final) (Canada); AD–softwood lumber (final)
(Canada). Id.
109. Id.

File: Picker Macro 122704.doc

92

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:25 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:26 PM

[Vol. 30:1

dant in seven cases.110 This is significantly less than one would
expect given the relative sizes of the economies. Yet, when interstate disputes under NAFTA and CUSFTA are included, the
numbers change. The U.S. numbers increase from eighty-two
to eighty-seven, while Canada’s increase from seven to ten.111
Respectively, this represents an increase of 6.1% for the United
States, and 43% for Canada—showing the significance of
NAFTA/CUSFTA dispute settlement for Canada as compared
with the United States.112 The ratio of cases in which each state
is a defendant also changes, with the United States appearing
as a defendant less often. This expanded ratio compares more
favorably with the size of each country’s economy and takes into
account the less diversified Canadian economy.113 While these
numbers will change over time, they are sufficient to show that
U.S. and Canadian behavior does not significantly differ with
respect to perceived rule-breaking. Certainly, existing differences between the two countries are not sufficient to explain
their disparate reputations.
3. Pivotal Cases
While empirical analysis helps compare U.S. and Canadian
trade behaviors, NAFTA and the WTO’s relatively short time of
operation suggests that reliance upon this analysis alone may
be problematic.114 Perhaps a better measure would be to exam110. See Canada Dispute Settlement, supra note 102.
111. For details of NAFTA cases, see NAFTA SECRETARIAT, DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT, PANEL DECISIONS AND REPORTS, at http://www.nafta-secalena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?ArticleID=76 (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
112. Id.
113. A comparison of Canadian economic figures, with its reliance on limited sectors of its economy for a significant share of its export trade, supports
the idea that the Canadian economy is relatively less diversified than the U.S.
economy. See, e.g., THE ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 120, 222 (e.g., for Canada—of $284.6 billion in exports—energy, forest, agricultural and vehicle
exports, at $147.8 billion, take 52% of that total export figure; whereas for the
United States it does not appear so easy to isolate specific sectors as constituting a large portion of the export economy).
114. The World Trade Organization was established in 1994, pursuant to
the Marrakesh Agreement. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The establishment of NAFTA dates to 1992. NAFTA, supra note 68.
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ine the cases themselves, with a focus on the particularly highprofile disputes. The following section shows that both states
may have expended resources on cases viewed with significant
revulsion by other parts of the world, yet their reputations have
not changed as a result.
Interestingly, the United States and Canada have frequently
been involved in the same controversial cases.115 A classic example is the Beef Hormones case,116 where the United States
was, and continues to be, castigated for its involvement.117 Depictions of the United States forcing hormone-laced beef on a
health-conscious European community were widespread.118 Yet
Canada was an equal partner in the dispute, though it escaped

115. The United States was involved in the Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Shrimp–Turtle case), the Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (Steel Safeguards case), and
many other cases that have received negative responses from around the
world. Interestingly, Canada has also been involved in some of these cases.
WTO Report of the Appellate Body, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), 38 I.L.M.
118 (1999) [hereinafter Shrimp–Turtle Case]; WTO Report of the Appellate
Body, United States–Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain
Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R (Dec. 10, 2003); see also, Mike Dolan, A Generation Takes a
Stand, TIME MAG., Mar. 31, 2003, at 72 (environmentalists from around the
world have protested the U.S. position in the Shrimp-Turtle case).
116. WTO Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities–Measures
Affecting Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter WTO Beef Hormones case]. In the Beef Hormones case, the Appellate
Body considered two panel reports, composed of the same three panelists,
following a merger of the panel established at the request of the United States
in May 1996 and the Panel established in October 1996 at the request of Canada. Id. para. 1. The complaint concerned a prohibition by the European
Communities of imports of meat and meat products derived from cattle administered natural or synthetic hormones to promote growth. Id. para. 2.
The Appellate Body concluded that the prohibitions violated the Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, as the prohibitions were not based on risk assessment under Article 5.1. of that agreement.
Id. para. 253.
117. Shelley Emling, U.S., European Union Toe-to-Toe Over Trade Issues,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 2, 2003, at D1.
118. Marc Victor, Precaution or Protectionism? The Precautionary Principle,
Genetically Modified Organisms, and Allowing Unfounded Fear to Undermine
Free Trade, 14 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 295, 309–10 (2001).
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with its reputation unscathed.119 Although the United States
and Canada prevailed at the WTO, many Europeans remain
very upset about the decision and have been slow to comply
with the ruling.120 The decision engendered much passion in
Europe,121 so much so that that the EU has suffered serious
trade retaliation as a result.122 The EU’s reaction to the Beef
Hormones decision reflects a widely-held belief that Americans’
unhealthy lifestyle and an American culture is being foisted on
the rest of the world—a culture rampant with large and noxious
feedlots and concomitant use of hormones and antibiotics.123
Yet, despite its involvement in the case, the negative view of the
United States has not been extended to Canada.124
While Canada has been allied with the United States in many
of the WTO’s most contentious cases, it has also had its own
contentious cases. Indeed, perhaps one of the most notorious
cases in the WTO pantheon is the Asbestos case, where Canada
was squarely in the line of fire.125 The Asbestos case, described
simply, was a case in which the EU defended against a Canadian challenge to a French import prohibition on asbestos products.126 While there were valid arguments concerning which
119. WTO Beef Hormones case, supra note 116. Canada and the United
States brought simultaneous cases on the same issues. Id.
120. Indeed, the Europeans recently announced that they would make permanent the ban on products containing at least one of the disputed hormones.
See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, WTO/NAFTA
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UPDATE 2 (March 9, 2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispu
te_Settlement/asset_upload_file316_5697.pdf.
121. George H. Rountree, Raging Hormones: A Discussion of the World
Trade Organization’s Decision in the European Union–United States Beef Dispute, 27 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 607, 609 (1999). Among European misgivings
are fears of hormone-impacted baby food. See Kristen Mueller, Note, Hormonal Imbalance: An Analysis of the Hormone-Treated Beef Trade Dispute Between the United States and the European Union, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 97, 102
(1996) (discussing other European concerns about beef from hormone-treated
cattle).
122. See Daniel Wüger, The Never-Ending Story: The Implementation Phase
in the Dispute Between the EC and the United States on Hormone-Treated
Beef, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 777, 795 (2002).
123. See Rountree, supra note 121, at 609.
124. Id.
125. WTO Asbestos Report, supra note 9.
126. The regulation in question was French Decree No. 96-1133 Concerning
Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (Decree), which entered into force
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provisions of the WTO were applicable to the disputed regulation,127 the case also challenged French attempts to protect
themselves from what they considered harmful asbestos products.128 The Canadians, in contrast, argued that the first WTO
panel erred in finding that the asbestos at issue poses a risk to
human health.129
Despite the fact that Canada approved the appointed experts,
Canada challenged their findings that the asbestos was carcinogenic and could not be safely contained.130 The WTO Appellate body ruled against Canada on this issue, with some stinging commentary from one of the judges.131 It is hard to find a
case less defensible. Yet, once again, international disdain for
Canada’s position does not appear to have lingered for a suffi1 January 1997. Le Journal Officiel de la République Française [Official
Journal of the French Republic] 1996, Décret no 96-1133 du 24 décembre 1996
relatif à l'interdiction de l'amiante, pris en application du code du travail et du
code de la consummation [Decree No. 96-1133 of December 24, 1996 relative
to the prohibition of asbestos, pursuant to the code of fair labor standards and
the consumption act], available at http://droit.org/jo/19961226/TAST
9611675D.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004). Article 1 set forth a general prohibition on asbestos or products containing asbestos fibers. Id. Article 2 set
limited and temporary exceptions for materials containing chrysotile fiber. Id.
127. Canada maintained that the Decree fell within the scope of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), and that the Panel’s
refusal to consider its allegations under this agreement should be reversed as
an error of law. WTO Asbestos Report, supra note 9, para. 10–14. Specifically,
Canada argued that the Panel incorrectly considered the prohibitions and
exceptions in the Decree to be separate measures in determining whether the
Decree constituted a “technical regulation” under the TBT Agreement; that it
misinterpreted the definition of “technical regulation;” and that it erred in
concluding that the TBT Agreement did not apply to a general prohibition like
the one in the Decree. Id.
128. Id. para. 16.
129. Id. para 158 (Canada argued that the panel erred “in finding that there
is a risk to human health associated with the manipulation of chrysotilecement [asbestos] products.”).
130. Id. para. 19.
131. Id. para. 152. As stated in the opinon:
It is difficult for me to imagine what evidence relating to economic
competitive relationships as reflected in end-uses and consumers'
tastes and habits could outweigh and set at naught the undisputed
deadly nature of chrysotile asbestos fibers, compared with PCG fibers, when inhaled by humans, and thereby compel a characterization of "likeness" of chrysotile asbestos and PCG fibers.
Id.
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cient period to influence Canada’s reputation in the same way
that more defensible American positions have sullied the reputation of the United States.132
Though Canada has been involved in significantly fewer cases
before the WTO, it is nonetheless easy to show its involvement,
either directly or in a supportive role, in some of the most criticized cases among the WTO and other trade regimes.133 Were
one to simply look at the details of international trade cases
involving the United States and Canada, it is unlikely that
there would be a sufficient basis to support the differences in
their trade reputations.
C. Protectionism
Trade reputations are not solely forged battles before dispute
resolution bodies. They are also formed with respect to states’
internal actions. Within the world trade system, good players
are states that employ protectionist measures sparingly and
transparently.134 The United States, however, has the reputa132. Shrimp–Turtle Case, supra note 115; Report of the WTO Appellate
Body, European Communities–Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (September 9, 1997), 37 I.L.M. 243 (1998).
The United States’ involvement in the Turtles and Bananas cases was far
more defensible, yet it still faced widespread criticism. See, e.g., Dolan, supra
note 115. Additionally, I surveyed the law review articles available on the
Westlaw database for articles comparing the Asbestos case to the Bananas
case. This unscientific, yet telling, survey showed that significantly greater
attention was provided to the American Bananas case than to the Canadian
Asbestos case.
133. Similarly, there are other examples of contentious cases outside the
WTO. For example, a particularly egregious case is the NAFTA case under
CUSFTA regarding the U.S. lobster fisheries. NAFTA Arbitral Panel Report,
United States Regulations on Lobster, USA-89-1807-01 (May 25, 1990) available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/
FTA_Chapter_18/USA/uc89010e.pdf [hereinafter Lobsters Case]. In the Lobsters Case, Canada tried to have a U.S. conservation regulation on lobster
catch sizes thrown out under the Free Trade Agreement. Id. (The United
States enacted an amendment to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act to prohibit the sale, transport in or from the United
States of whole live lobsters smaller than the minimum possession size in
effect under U.S. federal law). The Panel, however, ruled in favor of the
United States, finding that the United States conservation measure was not
in violation of the obligations of the United States under CUSFTA. Id. para.
11.1.1–11.2.
134. See generally WTO Agreement, supra note 117, pmbl.
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tion of aggressively employing its domestic trade remedies in a
manner that results in protectionism.135 Further, it has a reputation for providing subsidies for a range of products in order to
protect domestic industries.136 The United States is, consequently, not considered a good player with respect to protectionist trade policies.
In particular, the United States is criticized for its utilization
and administration of safeguard, antidumping, and antisubsidy (countervailing duty) remedies.137 Employment of these
mechanisms is viewed, rightly or wrongly, as essentially protectionist.138 In part, as a direct response to the historical perception and criticism of the United States’ protectionist practices,
the WTO negotiations included specific agreements on antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards.139 Indeed, antidumping and countervailing duty actions are almost synonymous with U.S. trade law.140

135. See, e.g., Rebecca Kanter, United States v. Nippon Paper Industries:
Price-Fixing Conspiracy or Trade Remedy?, 8 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
165, 178 (2003).
136. See, e.g., Randolph B. Persaud, Shades of American Hegemony: The
Primitive, the Enlightened, and the Benevolent, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 165, 178 (2003).
137. See, e.g., Dr. Mario E. Carranza, Mercosur, the Free Trade Area of the
Americas, and the Future of the U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1029, 1063 (2004).
138. See, e.g., Kelly Henry, Is the United States the World’s Dumping
Ground for Steel? Recent Influxes in Steel Imports in the United States, the
Effects, and the Possible Remedies, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 381, 383–84 (2003); E.
Kwaku Andoh, Countervailing Duties in a Not Quite Perfect World: An Economic Analysis, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1515, 1516, 1525–27 (1992).
139. See generally Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protection in the New Millennium: the Ascendancy of Antidumping Measures, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 49,
54–55 (1997) (describing the history of antidumping rules and the increasing
usage of antidumping measures); Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Remedies Against Unfair International Trade Practices, SE06 ALI-ABA 337 (1999) (“The Uruguay
Round Agreements Act resulted in approximately 70 changes to United States
antidumping and countervailing duty laws.”); Paul C. Rosenthal & Robert
T.C. Vermylen, The WTO Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements: Did the
United States Achieve its Objectives During the Uruguay Round?, 31 LAW &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 871, 873–74 (2000) (describing the defensive policy objectives
of U.S. negotiators during the Uruguay Round).
140. Recent statistics show that the U.S. is responsible for 72% of countervailing duties, whereas Canada is responsible for 6%. J.G. Castel & C.M.
Gastle, Deep Economic Integration Between Canada and the United States,
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Canada’s actions in this sphere, however, are not much different than those of the United States. Canada, like the United
States, engages in a fair amount of activity that should perturb
the international trading community. Canada, like other advanced industrialized states, is a heavy user and innovator of
these and other trade remedies.141 Indeed, Canada had the first
antidumping law in 1904, a full sixteen years before the first
real U.S antidumping law in 1921.142 Another particularly problematic form of protectionism, known as the voluntary restraint
agreement (VRA), originated in Canada.143 Just as the world
trading community’s response to U.S. protectionist mechanisms
led to innovative agreements, the VRA was also explicitly prohibited in the WTO.144 Similarly, it was prohibitive Canadian
restrictions on foreign investments that led to the WTO’s
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs).145
Examples of such similarity are not confined to history. Canada, like the United States, continues to have protectionist
problems. These issues are raised in the generally neutral
WTO report on Canada.146 For example, despite significant reductions in the majority of goods subject to tariffs, Canada still
maintains significant tariffs on textiles, boats, footwear, clothing, wine, cider, sugar, vegetables (during their growing seaThe Emergence of Strategic Innovation Policy and the Need for Trade Law
Reform, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 9 n.28 (1998).
141. See WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at 41–48. E.g., more
than thirty-five countries are subject to Canada’s antidumping measures. Id.
at 44.
142. HART, supra note 60, at 182.
143. Id. at 193.
144. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 11(1)(b), THE LEGAL
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S 275, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg.pdf.
145. See Foreign Investment Review Act, Act of Dec. 12, 1973, Ch. 46, 197374 F.C. 619 (Can.), as amended (repealed 1985). This Canadian law led to a
GATT panel decision, which in turn lead to the WTO’s TRIMS Agreement. See
Canada Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Feb. 7, 1984,
th
GATT B.I.S.D. (30 Supp.) at 140, 143–44 (1984). See also JACKSON, supra
note 59, at 1137.
146. See WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at 33. See also, William
Watson, Editorial, Why Does a Tiger Need Tariffs?, NAT’L POST, Mar. 19, 2003,
at 19 (addressing the WTO Trade Policy Review of Canada from March 14,
2003).
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son), and on cut flowers.147 Another problematic area concerns
the numerous State Trading Enterprises148 that cover such sectors as alcoholic beverages, dairy products, fish, and wheat.149
A specific area of recent concern is the steel industry. The
United States received tremendous criticism recently over the
protection of its steel industry. The close ties between the U.S.
and Canadian steel industries suggested that there was a serious possibility that Canada may have joined in this protectionism.150 Ottawa has managed, however, to avoid applying the
same steel safeguards imposed by President Bush. Indeed, the
Canadian International Trade Tribunal determined that tariffs
should be imposed, although Ottawa ultimately rejected the
recommendation.151 Nonetheless, Ottawa considered working
closely with the United States on joint efforts to deal with this
“problem” and in formation of the North American Steel Trade
Committee to work out a joint response.152 Canada’s continuing
protectionist practices reinforce the similarities between the
two states’ trade behaviors.
This discussion should not be read as equating Canadian protectionist measures with the United States in all instances. For
example, there is no Canadian equivalent to the globally unpopular U.S. section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.153 Internationally, section 301 is perhaps the most despised domestic

147. See WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at 33.
148. See, e.g., Michael T. Roberts, The Unique Role of State Trading Enterprises in World Agriculture Trade: Sifting Through Rhetoric, 6 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 287, 290 (2001) (“Loosely defined, STEs are enterprises authorized
to engage in trade and owned, sanctioned, or otherwise supported by the government. Special or exclusive privileges granted by their governments allow
STEs to influence through their purchases or sales the level or direction of
trade in their commodities.”).
149. WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at 75; see also Roberts, supra
note 148, at 294.
150. Indeed, steel is a primary focus of recent Canadian domestic trade
measures. See, e.g., WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at 44–45.
151. David Pannon, Steelworkers Union Wants Provinces to Push Ottawa to
Penalize Cheap Imports, CAN. PRESS, October 6, 2003, available at 2003 WL
65007279.
152. Id.
153. Trade Act § 310 (The Act allows the President to take action against
any country which has acted against the trade interests of the United States).
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trade law.154 Indeed, the United States employment of section
301 provided the stimulus at the Uruguay Round for the creation of binding dispute settlement procedures to wean the
United States from employment of its unilateral Section 301
actions.155 Alternatively, Canada has historically used globally
unpopular protective devices, such as cultural protections, not
available in the United States.156 At times these protective devices have fallen afoul of Canadian international trade commitments.157 A salient example of cultural protectionism can be
found in the WTO Magazines case.158 In that case, Canada attempted to protect Canadian magazines by restricting foreign
advertising in Canadian versions of foreign magazines.159 The
WTO found Canadian measures to be a violation of Canada’s
national treatment obligations under the WTO.160
In addition to trade remedies, protections may also take the
form of assistance to industry or other sectors of the economy.
Indeed, large subsidies provided to agriculture have caused the
United States’ reputation to suffer tremendously in recent
years.161 Despite talk by the U.S. government of its commitment
to trade liberalization and reducing barriers around the world,
the farm subsidies in the Farm Security and Rural Investment

154. Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global
Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn From Mediators, Business
Strategists, and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 575
n. 37 (2002).
155. See, e.g., Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 13–14
(1999).
156. Id. See generally Ronald G. Atkey, Canadian Cultural Industries Exemption From NAFTA – Its Parameters, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 177, 184 (1997)
(providing examples of other cultural industries and protection issues in Canada).
157. See Oliver R. Goodenough, Defending the Imaginary to the Death? Free
Trade, National Identity, and Canada’s Cultural Preoccupation, 15 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 203, 210–21 (1998).
158. Report of the WTO Appellate Body, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, at 449 (June 30, 1997) (WTO Doc # 972653).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 479–80.
161. See, e.g., World Digest: Mexican and U.S. Lawmakers Talk Trade, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 16, 2004, at A15; What U.S. Can Do Before 2005,
Jan. 18, 2004, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, at 4H.
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Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Act)162 shocked the global trading community.163 The 2002 Farm Act reversed the move towards liberalization of U.S. agriculture that started in the 1996 farm
bill.164 The 2002 Farm Act authorized the expenditure of tens of
billions of dollars in subsidies over a ten-year period.165 The international trading community was stunned and dismayed by
this change of direction.166 The subsidies continue to impinge
upon the United States’ reputation as a champion of free
trade.167
Canada has no shortage of domestic subsidies either, including significant protections for its vast agricultural sector.168 Historically, while Canada has pushed agricultural trade reform, it
was politically unable to dispense with protections for some of
its agricultural sectors.169 For example, Canada’s dairy and
poultry sectors are protected from international competition.170
These sectors are regulated under a “supply management”
framework.171 The dairy sector has received over a third of the
government’s subsidy monies and has its production strictly
controlled through the Canadian Milk Supply Management
Committee.172 Other agricultural recipients of economic support
include those sectors taking part in the Spring Credit Advance
Program, which allows them to receive interest-free, govern162. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171,
116 Stat. 134 (2002).
163. Clete D. Johnson, A Barren Harvest for the Developing World? Presidential “Trade Promotion Authority” and the Unfulfilled Promise of Agriculture Negotiations in the Doha Round, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 437, 442
(2004).
164. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN OECD COUNTRIES 205 (2003), available at
http://www1.oecd.org/publications/e-book/5103081E.PDF (last visited Oct. 13,
2004) [hereinafter OECD AGRICULTURAL POLICIES].
165. See, e.g., Tom Carter, U.S. Farm Policy Sows Ire in Africa, WASH.
TIMES, July 3, 2003, at A16.
166. Johnson, supra note 163, at 442.
167. Id.
168. See WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at 94–105.
169. See HART, supra note 60, at 446. Canada accomplished this by eliminating subsidies, rationalizing protectionist measures and generally moving
the sector to be more in tune with the advances in other economic sectors. Id.
170. Id. See WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at ix, para. 17.
171. Dale E. McNiel, The NAFTA Panel Decision on Canadian Tariff–Rate
Quotas: Imagining A Tariffying Bargain, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 345, 349 (1997).
172. OECD AGRICULTURAL POLICIES, supra note 164, at 121.
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ment-guaranteed loans to assist in planting.173 Additional subsidies are supplied through the Crop Insurance Program, which
has made record payments in recent years because of ongoing
drought conditions.174 Admittedly, Canada has recently embarked on a New Agricultural Policy Framework.175 However, it
remains unclear what impact this Framework will have on Canadian agricultural subsidies and protections.
As evidence of the impact these protections should have on
Canada’s reputation, Canada’s agricultural protections have
repeatedly been the subject of dispute settlement proceedings at
the WTO and NAFTA.176 For example, the Canadian dairy and
poultry supply management system was challenged in the first
state-to-state settlement proceedings before the NAFTA.177
Thus, Canada, like the United States, has gone to great lengths
to protect its agricultural sector.
To the extent agricultural protections influence world reputation, the similarity between Canadian and U.S. agricultural
protections suggests that the reputations of the two should be
comparable. Furthermore, agriculture is merely one example of
the similarities between the two states in engaging in protectionist measures to safeguard domestic industries and interests.178 While there are differences in their protectionist styles,
173. Id.
174. Id. at 122.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Report of the WTO Appellate Body, Canada–Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products,
WT/DS103/AB/RW2 (Dec. 20, 2002), WT/DS103/AB/R/Corr.1 (Oct. 18, 1999),
WT/DS103/AB/R (Oct. 13, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/distabase_wto_members1_e.htm; FTA Ch. 18 Arbitral Panel
Report, The Interpretation of and Canada's Compliance With Article 701.3
With Respect to Durum Wheat Sales, CDA-92-1807-01 (Feb. 8, 1993) [CUSFTA
Case], available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/
Dispute/english/FTA_Chapter_18/Canada/cc92010e.pdf.
177. NAFTA Ch. 20 Arbitral Panel Report, Tariffs Applied by Canada to
Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products, CDA-95-2008-01 (Dec. 2, 1996),
available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute%
5Cenglish%5CNAFTA_Chapter_20%5CCanada%5Ccb95010e.pdf.
178. Compare the Canadian attempts to protect its aviation sector with that
of the United States. Compare Report of the WTO Appellate Body, Canada–
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2,
1999) (Doc # 99-3221), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments
/t/WT/DS/70ABR.DOC, and Helena D. Sullivan, Regional Jet Trade Wars:
Politics and Compliance in WTO Dispute Resolution, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL
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these differences do not justify the significant differences in
reputation.
D. Additional Evidence of Reputational Differences Between the
United States and Canada
In addition to the previously mentioned trade irritants practiced by the United States, there are a host of peripheral issues
that contribute to the U.S. position in the world trading system.
Some of these issues will be discussed below; however, it should
be noted that there are too many to be covered within the scope
of this Article. Like the previous section, this section will compare U.S. actions and equivalent or comparable Canadian actions.
One of the most contentious international trade issues is the
use of WTO commitments to open markets to new and troubling
technological and scientific developments.179 Examples include
the use of beef hormones, genetically–modified food, and widespread use of antibiotics in livestock.180 The United States is
heavily criticized for pushing the technological envelope despite
concerns about the harmful effects of these new technologies.181
Yet, in almost all of these areas the United States is not alone.
Canada also pushes the envelope with respect to these same
areas—no doubt a reflection of their similar economies.182
Another divisive area in international trade is the inclusion of
allegedly “non-trade”-related issues such as environmental, labor, and human rights into trade agreements.183 The United
States has periodically pushed for the inclusion of environTRADE 71 (2003), with Daniel I. Fisher, “Super Jumbo” Problem: Boeing, Airbus, and the Battle for the Geopolitical Future, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 865
(2002), and European Commission Offers to Review Aircraft Subsidies Pact,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 20, 2004, at http://www.insidetrade.com/secure
/wto_iust.asp.
179. Daniel Kalderimis, Problems of WTO Harmonization and the Virtues of
Shields Over Swords, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 305, 323–26 (2004).
180. Id.
181. Joe Garofali, Genetically Altered Food at Heart of Controversy/Activists
Protest Sacramento Meeting of Ag Ministers, S.F. CHRON., June 23, 2003, at
A1.
182. See, e.g., WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at 17.
183. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Linking Topics in Treaties, 19 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 329 (1998) (describing the trend of U.S. negotiators to link trade
agreements and labor and environmental side agreements).

File: Picker Macro 122704.doc

104

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:25 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:26 PM

[Vol. 30:1

mental safeguards and labor rights in trade agreements.184
Their inclusion in NAFTA was at the United States’s instigation.185 These “non-trade”-related commitments are highly unpopular in much of the world.186 They are often considered unrelated to traditional notions of international trade and, instead,
are thought of as attempts by interest groups in the developed
world, such as organized labor, to provide hidden protectionist
benefits.187 It is argued that enforcement of labor, environmental, and human rights provisions would erode the comparative advantage of developing states where, for example, labor
inputs are cheap and environmental regulations are either unenforced or nonexistent.188 Perceptions of states’ human rights
enforcement, conversely, are often viewed as easily manipulated
by outside states for their own political goals. Furthermore, the
content and coverage of human rights provisions can reflect the
requesting party’s cultural biases.189 Due in part to concerns, for
example, that environmental issues will come back to haunt it,
Canada has not been as assertive as the United States on these
issues. Still, Canada has continued to argue for the inclusion of

184. See, e.g., Mohammad Nsour, Fundamental Facets of the United StatesJordan Free Trade Agreement: E-Commerce, Dispute Resolution, and Beyond,
27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 742, 779-80 (2004).
185. See The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC), Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480; North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
32 I.L.M. 1499. See also Sarah Lowe, The First American Case Under the
North American Agreement for Labor Cooperation, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 481,
487–88 (1997); Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the Enforcement
Provisions of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC as a Model
for Future Accords, 35 ENVTL. L. 31, 35–36 (1995).
186. Padideh Ala’i, A Human Rights Critique of the WTO: Some Preliminary
Observations, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 537, 551 (2001).
187. Philip M. Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade
Organization, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 725, 752 (2004).
188. Arthur E. Appleton, Telecommunications Trade: Reach Out and Touch
Someone?, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 209, 215 (1998).
189. See generally Matthew A. Ritter, “Human Rights”: Would You Recognize One If You Saw One? A Philosophical Hearing of International Rights
Talk, 27 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 265 (1997) (describing the internationalization of
human rights talk and the difficulties inherent in these talks due to variations
in language, culture and philosophy).
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core labor standards and multilateral environmental agreements in the WTO.190
A related area of great international concern is the use of
trade to further national security and foreign policies.191 Of particular importance is use by the United States of unilateral export controls, sanctions, and embargoes to further its own foreign policy and national security goals.192 Controls, such as the
embargo on Cuba,193 raise considerable ire around the world.194
This is particularly true when controls are imposed extraterritorially on non-U.S. persons.195 Sometimes, states even go so far
as to enact laws specifically prohibiting their citizens from complying with U.S. laws.196 These U.S. actions have done much to
tarnish its reputation.197

190. See Center for International Developments at Harvard, Global Trade
Negotiations Homepage: Canada Summary, at http://www.cid.harvard.edu
/cidtrade/gov/canadagov.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004); see also WTO Trade
Policy Review, supra note 79, at 20.
191. See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Trade Controls for Political Ends: Four
Perspectives, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 355, 362 (2003) (opposition to U.S. Siberian pipeline policy); John W. Boscariol, An Anatomy of a Cuban Pyjama Crisis: Reconsidering Blocking Legislation in Response to Extraterritorial Trade Measures
of the United States, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 439 (1999) (U.S. trade policy
with respect to Cuba).
192. See, e.g., Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 535.
193. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6000-6010 (Supp. V. 1993)
(prohibiting any person, corporation in the United States or any foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, from trading with Cuba, except under specified
circumstances).
194. See generally Harry L. Clark, Dealing with U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions and Foreign Countermeasures, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 455 (2004) (describing challenges to U.S. extraterritorial sanctions under international
trade agreements); see George Kleinfeld & Deborah Wengel, Foreign Investment, 31 INT’L LAW. 403, 411 (1997).
195. See, e.g., Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172,
110 Stat. 1541 (1996) (imposing sanctions on any person making large investments of a type that would aid Iran or Libya in developing petroleum
resources or weapons systems).
196. See, e.g., “Ley de Proteccion al Comercio y la Inversion de Normas Extranjeras que Contravengan el Derecho Internacional,” D.O., 23 de octubre de
1996 (Mex.), translated in Mexico: Act to Protect Trade and Investment From
Foreign Norms That Contravene International Law, 36 I.L.M. 133 (1997)
(Mexico’s blocking statute against the Helms-Burton Act).
197. Natalie Maniaci, The Helms-Burton Act: Is the U.S. Shooting Itself in
the Foot?, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 897, 909 (1998).
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Canada also has foreign policy and national security sanction
laws. Yet, the bulk of Canada’s sanctions are multilateral, pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions.198 Nonetheless, Canada reserves the right to enact unilateral or multilateral sanctions that are not Security Council-authorized.199
Still, this is a far cry from the sanctions and embargoes pursued
by the United States. Trade behaviors that further national
security and foreign policy goals provide an example of differences between the two states, though one which may simply
reflect U.S. involvement in geopolitics to an extent not shared
by Canada. Thus, these few examples generally show that even
in peripheral areas of international trade there are insufficient
differences to justify the two states’ dissimilar reputations.
IV. REPUTATIONAL FALLACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
As discussed earlier, reputation is viewed as an important
mechanism in the smooth operation of the international legal
system.200 Yet, as the previous section demonstrates, reputation
may not reflect the reality of state behavior. The disparity between a state’s reputation and its behavior leads to a few questions: (1) what is the source of this reputational disparity, (2)
what is or should be the real role of reputation in international
law, and (3) what are the consequences if state reputation is not
reasonably related to state actions? In exploring possible answers to these questions, the following section will delve into
potential factors outside the trade arena that may influence
reputation. The discussion will then turn to the benefits for
individual states and the international legal system when reputation is scrutinized and reputational fallacies are exposed.

198. See, e.g., United Nations Act, R.S.C., ch. U-2 (1985) (Can.); Special
Economic Measures Act, S.C., ch. 17 (1992) (Can.); Export and Import Permits
Act, R.S.C., ch. E-19 (1985) (Can.). See also International Trade Canada, Canadian Economic Sanctions, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/sanctionsen.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
199. See, e.g., The Special Economic Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. 17 § 4(1)
(1992) (Can.) (allowing the Governor in Council to order seizure or freeze any
property held by foreign states of foreign nationals when s/he believes there
has been a grave breach of international peace and security).
200. See Guzman, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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A. Non-Trade Action Sources of International Legal Reputations
The previous section of this Article showed that similarities
in the behavior of Canada and the United States in international trade produced disparate international reputations for
the two states. While there may be a whole host of reasons for
this phenomenon, two possible causes stand out: reputational
spill-over and differing levels of interaction among states. In
other words, the general reputation of the United States or
Canada in international affairs spills over into the trade arena
and/or other states have radically different levels of interaction
vis-à-vis the United States and Canada, with a concomitantly
different impact upon each state’s reputation.
States’ reputations are not based solely on a state’s activities
within one specific field. Rather, their reputations reflect the
whole gamut of their behavior across widely-dispersed fields.
Reputation earned in one or more fields may “spill-over” into
another field. Thus, isolating cause and effect in the creation of
state reputation within one remote field can be difficult, if not
impossible. While it is true that reputation can be established
narrowly within a field by looking at a single action, when examining the field as a whole it is harder to isolate the cause of
that reputation.201 This is especially true for a state such as the
United States, which is very active in many parts of the international environment and tends to have a profound impact on
the world in many different arenas.
Unfortunately, and for reasons beyond the scope of this Article, the generalized world impression of the United States is
strongly negative.202 For example, the United States is the
global symbol of negative market forces such as capitalism,
globalization, and the spread of materialism—despite the fact
that other states are equally involved in these movements.203
201. A narrow area for establishing reputation could be paying United Nations membership dues; however, expanding the analysis to a state’s general
relationship with the United Nations or other multilateral institutions makes
determination of the exact factors influencing reputation extremely difficult.
But see Downs & Jones, supra note 7, at 109–10 (claiming that states have
multiple reputations in varying international arenas).
202. See, e.g., Christopher Marquis, Public Relations Chief Admits U.S. Has
a Big Image Problem, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 6, 2004, at 5.
203. See Elemer Hankiss, Symbols of Destruction, in SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH COUNCIL: ESSAYS ON 9/11 (2001) (describing the U.S. position as the
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With the widespread unpopularity of these movements at various times, anti-Americanism has become commonplace.204 Indeed, there is now a visceral negative reaction by many around
the world to anything American.205 Anti-Americanism has itself
become a part of the world’s culture.206 True, there are periods
where negative responses to America are momentarily replaced
with a more positive view, such as after the World Trade Center
attack,207 or in Eastern Europe for the brief period following the
fall of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.208
However, the default view is that America and its international
activities reflect the wrong side of an issue.209 Given the depth
of feeling arrayed against the United States, it would not be
surprising if some negative feelings were directed at the activities of the United States in international trade, regardless of
actual U.S. trade activities.
Consequently, the world’s negative view of U.S. trade activities, and its correspondingly more positive view of Canada’s, is
predictable in light of the “spill-over” effect. The “spill-over”
effect appears to exist despite the fact that specialized state officials may come to know the reputation of a state in a specific
field. This may occur because a state, while having different
compliance rates within specific fields, will still have an overarching reputation driven by national strategies, domestic politics, constitutional concerns, traditional relationships, and so
symbolic center of the world—albeit before 9/11), at http://www.ssrc.org/
sept11/essays/hankiss.htm.
204. See, e.g., Jonah Goldberg, Europe on the Whine, NAT’L REV. ONLINE,
June 13, 2001, at http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/goldberg061301.
shtml; World Edition Quiz: How widespread is Anti-Americanism?, BBC
NEWS, Jan. 7, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2635419.stm.
205. Goldberg, supra note 204; World Edition Quiz, supra note 204.
206. See, e.g., Opinions, What Did We Do Now? Our Stand: America Again
Object of Hate, Obsession, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 29, 2004, at V4.
207. See, e.g., Richard Bernstein, Two Years Later: World Opinion; Foreign
Views of U.S. Darken After Sept 11, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, at A1 (noting
that while “world sympathy and support” for the United States was widespread immediately after September 11, such support has since declined).
208. See, e.g., Gareth Harding, EU Expansion Good for the U.S., UNITED
PRESS INT’L, Dec. 24, 2002, at A1 (noting that many Central and Eastern
Europeans were pro-American after the fall of communism, but that the “proAmerican euphoria of the early ‘90s has worn off”).
209. This is not to say such views are right or wrong, simply that they exist.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 40.
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on.210 The overarching reputation may spill over into the minds
of practitioners and government officials. These individuals,
normally focused on narrow parts of specific fields, may then be
affected by the overarching reputation and believe that the
overarching reputation represents a state better than their individual perceptions based on a limited level of interaction.211
Another possible explanation for the reputational difference
between the United States and Canada is the radically different
levels of interaction they have with other states. A different
relative presence on the world stage is likely to produce different reputations. It is clear that most states interact with Canada far less frequently than with the United States. As noted
earlier, Canada’s economy is less diversified and smaller than
the United States’.212 Canada also trades almost exclusively
with the United States.213 Therefore, only a small portion of
Canada’s comparatively smaller volume of trade impacts other
states. As a result, Canadian policies, trade, and governmental
actions have less opportunity to upset other states. In contrast,
the much larger U.S. economy trades a relatively small portion
of its economy, roughly 22%, with Canada.214 This leaves a considerable amount of U.S. trade for the rest of the world, thus
providing significantly greater opportunity for conflict.
An economic data analysis supports the conclusion that increased contacts with other states may influence reputation. In
2000, Canadian exports and imports from non-U.S. economies
accounted for just under $107 billion.215 The United States, in
contrast, exported and imported $1,589 billion from non210. But see, Downs & Jones, supra note 7, at 101–04 (arguing that reputation will be field-specific, and arguing against the “unitary” reputation theorists).
211. Perhaps more troubling than the infection of trade specialists with the
overarching reputation, despite their perceptions to the contrary, is the corresponding inference that the generation of the overarching reputation may
occur despite the respective trade activities of the United States and Canada.
In other words, there is very little that could be done by each of these states
within international trade to alter their reputations.
212. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 121–22, 222–23. See infra, Part
III.B.1.
213. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 122 (85% of Canada’s trade is
with the United States).
214. Id. at 223.
215. Id. at 121.
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Canadian economies.216 In other words, the United States has
roughly fifteen times as much trade interaction with other
states as Canada does, and, hence, roughly fifteen times as
much opportunity to create a reputation with those states. It is
therefore reasonably predictable that states will think more
about their impression of the United States, whereas they will
have little or no experience with Canada upon which to make a
reputational determination. Furthermore, if one does not have
experience with another state, it is difficult to form a negative
view of that state. In contrast, interacting with the United
States is bound to cause both negative and positive experiences—though the negative tends to be focused upon by individuals and the media.217
As with reputational spill-over, interaction between states is,
in significant part, out of the hands of the states themselves.
Neither the United States nor Canada is able to easily change
its level of interaction with other states. Certainly, U.S. trade
policy-makers will not be able to single-handedly change the
global reputation of the United States that spills over into the
trade field. This impotence is a significant issue for the utility
of reputation in international law.
B. Reputational Fallacy: Problems and Solutions
The impact of state reputation can be significant, hence,
reputation needs to be accurate and reflect the real behavior of
states. Reputations will often be out of the control of the states
themselves, therefore an international effort to correct or compensate for reputational fallacies is vital to the health of the
international legal system.218 Accordingly, states’ reputations
must be thoroughly examined. Discovery of inaccurate reputation must be exposed. Such exposure will produce tangible
benefits for the individual states themselves and for the international law system as a whole.219
216. Id. at 223.
217. See e.g., Beverly Orndorff, Automatic Viligance System: Thoughts Tend
to the Negative, RICH. TIMES–DISPATCH, Oct. 18, 1992, at A13; Maksim I.
Shapir, The Aesthetic Experience of the Twentieth Century: The Avant-Garde
and Postmodernism, 2 PHILILOGICA 137, 140 (1995), available at
http://www.rvb.ru/philologica/02eng/02eng_postmodernism.htm.
218. See infra Part I, IV.B.2.
219. See infra Part IV.B.1.–B.2.
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1. Exposure of the Fallacy and the Individual States
Correcting a reputational falsehood can have immediate impact upon states that act similarly but have different reputations, such as the United States and Canada. Exposure of the
falsehood may, as an initial matter, serve to publicize the problem and therefore bring it to the attention of trade specialists,
some of whom will hopefully be instrumental in the development of the world trading regime. Specialists may also find
discussion of reputational fallacies helpful in understanding
attitudes toward states during multilateral proceedings. Discussion of reputational fallacies may also serve broader goals
than simply informing experienced negotiators. It may also
provide specific benefits to the individual states that have lived
under a false reputation—states that often believed the reputation to be accurate, even as to themselves. Thus, for example,
exposure of the reputational fallacies associated with the
United States and Canada may bring specific therapeutic and
instrumental benefits to each country.
Discussion of reputational fallacies may prove to be of therapeutic benefit to Americans. Many Americans traveling overseas are embarrassed by perceptions of U.S. behavior—
perceptions often shared by Americans themselves.220 This perception is evinced by Americans who masquerade as Canadians
while traveling in Europe by sporting a Canadian flag on their
backpacks!221 While such a scenario is not a serious issue, it reflects the worldview of Americans when placed in international
settings that may include more serious venues than the banter
in a youth hostel lounge, including venues such as multilateral
220. See, e.g., Allan M. Winkler, World Is Wondering What We’re Doing,
CINCINNATI POST, June 11, 2004, at A11; John Hind, What’s the Word?: Pretendanians: Americans Posing as Canadians, OBSERVER MAG., Mar. 17, 2003,
at 12 (“the trend is toward American travelers declaring themselves Canadian”).
221. See, e.g., Alice Thomas, Water Bottles A Sure Sign of Yanks Abroad,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 12, 2004, at B8 (“feeling like moving targets,
Americans abroad have adopted their own kind of camouflage…[some] have
been known to attach Canadian flags to their backpacks”); Nicholas Stein,
Newsmen and Con Men: That Trustworthy Canadian Accent Works Very Well
With American TV Audiences. But Trustworthiness Has an Evil Twin…,
FORTUNE, Feb. 23, 2004, at 56 (“when American teenagers travel abroad,
many affix a Canadian flag to their backpacks — the maple leaf often gets a
warmer reception than the Stars and Stripes.”).
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negotiations and other international law activities vital for the
interests of the United States. As the comparative analysis of
U.S. and Canadian reputation suggests, the United States is, in
many ways, just another state, albeit one with greater presence
and muscle. Accordingly, at least with respect to international
trade, there is no reason for an American to hide behind a Canadian flag.222 Therapeutically, it would do Americans good to
know that the United States is just another state.
Canada could also benefit therapeutically from the discussion
of reputational fallacies. Canada’s national self-image, AngloCanada’s at least, at times has been defined in terms of being
unlike the United States.223 Even if this is true only in small
measure, understanding reputational fallacies associated with
Canada and the United States may help purge this element of
the Canadian national character. Perhaps the realization that
Canada and the United States are similar in their external relations will free Canada from comparing itself with the United
States when considering its own identity. Canada is sufficiently unique that it need not compare itself to the United
States in order to fully realize its own identity. Canada’s real
identity does not lie within the fallacies propagated on the foreign stage, but, rather, on its own unique history and culture.
In addition to providing therapeutic benefits to both Canada
and the United States, exposing their reputational fallacies
should also produce tangible bilateral and multilateral benefits
in the world trading system. Purging their reputational fallacies should impact the United States–Canada relationship,
placing it on a more accurate footing. Increased understanding
of the actual attributes of each nation would contribute to the
222. Ironically, in matters of trade law, if not in other areas as well, the
masquerade is likely to be successful given the remarkable level of similarity
between the two states.
223. See, e.g., John Sullivan, The Lessons of Madrid: Canadians Are in Mass
Denial About Terrorism, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, March 21, 2004, at B6 (suggesting humorously, but nevertheless exposing something of Canadian’s national self-image, that “[t]he United States’ contributions to world culture are
bourbon and the 12-bar blues; ours is anti-Americanism.”). Atkey, supra note
156, at 179. This is not to suggest that Canadians are averse to engaging in
scathing self criticism, see, e.g., Murray Dobbin, Canada Is a World-Class
Trade Bully, NAT’L POST, Nov. 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL 29559593.
Though, given their world reputation, they may be the only real critics of their
own policies.
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development of this important bilateral relationship, as well as
provide a better basis for joint involvement at the multilateral
stage.
A truer understanding of each state’s behaviors and actions
may serve to “normalize” the relationship between the United
States and Canada. Canadians should benefit from a more balanced view of U.S. trade policy when they realize the substantial similarity of the two states in this field. Similarly, showing
the United States that Canada has similar trade behaviors and
is not a characterless “goody two-shoes” should help the United
States appreciate Canada for its strength and independence on
the world stage. Hopefully, this will encourage the United
States not to take for granted its special relationship with Canada. Given the substantial integration of the two states economically, socially, and geographically, such normalization is
long overdue. 224
The multilateral trading system will also benefit from debunking U.S. and Canadian reputational fallacies. Canada will
profit by being regarded in a truer light during negotiations.
The United States will benefit from international recognition
that it is not so different from the more favorably-viewed Canada. Clarification that Canadian behavior is substantially similar to that of the United States should result in a realization by
other international actors that the United States is just like
everybody else—though spotlighted more often than other nations—and, hence, should receive equal treatment regarding its
trade actions. Increased honesty in assessment of states should
allow increasingly transparent and honest negotiations, thus,
allowing states and their negotiators to more accurately respond to specific proposals, rather than the reputation of the
state advancing the proposal. This should serve to place Canada, the United States, and other states on a more level footing
during negotiations and international interactions.

224. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 68 (a trade agreement that affects both
the U.S. and Canadian economies). Remember the recent electrical blackouts
throughout the Northeast of the continent were transnational. See CNN.com,
Power Returns to Most Areas Hit by Blackout, Aug. 15, 2003 (the blackout
affected areas from Michigan to New York in the United States, and as far
north as Toronto, Canada), available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/
US/08/15/power.outage/.
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2. Exposure of the Fallacy and the International Legal System
In addition to helping states directly impacted by an inaccurate reputation, exposure of reputational fallacies will also positively impact the international legal system. As an initial matter, employment of inaccurate reputation disrupts the utility of
reputation as an enforcement mechanism.225 After all, it is difficult to shame a perceived rule-breaking state into compliance
when that state’s reputation of being a rule-breaker is inaccurate. Furthermore, it is questionable what a state can do to
change its behavior, and hence its reputation, if it is already in
compliance with relevant areas of international law. Additionally, as was shown in the trade context, a state may have little
ability to change its reputation in a specific field. Thus, while
the United States may make behavioral changes and modify
some rules out of shame or fear of sullying its reputation, its
reputation is unlikely to change.226 This scenario exemplifies
why it is crucial to ensure that reputation be accurate.
The consequences of these scenarios—that a state is the victim of inaccurate reputation and that other states can behave
the same and be viewed more positively—may undermine respect for the international system and/or encourage unlawful
activity by states. After all, a state may believe that compliance
with international law is not beneficial if it will continue to be
regarded as disreputable when compared with other similarly
situated states, regardless of its actual behavior. Similarly, the
legitimacy of the international legal system becomes questionable when states that behave similarly are not subject to the
same sanctions—in this case, the sanction of a bad reputation
and all the accompanying negative consequences.
In addition, inefficiencies will be introduced into the system.
For example, if the world’s view of America’s employment of
domestic trade mechanisms, such as antidumping actions, was
inaccurate, then antidumping provisions of the WTO or the ongoing negotiations on dumping actions during the present negotiating round may consequently be unnecessary, inefficient, or
out of touch with reality. This may not be the case, however, it
225. Downs & Jones, supra note 7, at 99–101.
226. Even if some modification of U.S. reputation resulted from behavioral
changes, the United States is still likely to suffer a relatively worse reputation
than states which exhibit substantially similar behavior.
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provides an effective example of how reputational fallacies can
impact the larger international legal system. Accordingly, exposure of reputational fallacies and recognition of the potential
distortions and consequences for the international legal system
are necessary to protect the system from illegitimacy, inefficiencies, and unjust results for specific states.
V. CONCLUSION
Reputation can play a useful role in international law.
Among other things, it can inform other states of a state’s behavioral propensities. Reputation may also serve to encourage
state compliance with international law, as states attempt to
shake off the effects of a negative reputation. However, as
shown in the context of the international trade reputations of
the United States and Canada, state reputations share much in
common with individual reputation and village gossip—they
can represent unsupported assumptions and reflect views derived from unrelated fields and activities. While it would not be
proper to extrapolate the findings in this Article to states’ reputations in all fields, nonetheless it concludes that concern regarding reputations and their accuracy is merited. Reputational fallacy is especially problematic considering the impact
that reputation can have on interstate interactions — from
international
dispute
adjudication
to
negotiations.
Additionally, fallacies can have a negative impact within a state
and contribute to an invalid self-image. They may also
contribute to strained relations between neighboring states, as
with the United States and Canada.
Accordingly, it is
important to establish the accuracy of reputations, or work to
make them more accurate through increased transparency and
information dissemination.
Understanding that reputational inaccuracies are commonplace is the first step in exposing reputational fallacies. Due to
the normative foundations of reputation determinations, it may
not be possible, or desirable, to establish whether a state is a
good or bad actor. Therefore, at a minimum, accurate state
reputations can and should be established comparatively.
Thus, examination of different states’ actions in international
law fields will elucidate whether states should have different
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reputations based on different behaviors.227 Purging reputational fallacies from international law is entirely possible. Removal of reputational fallacies in the international system
would mean that states with similar behaviors would have
comparable reputations in each field.
Additionally, fieldspecific reputation would not be impacted by reputations from
other unrelated fields or by a state’s level of interaction with
other states. Achieving this goal will go a long way towards
minimizing the negative impacts of fallacious reputations on
states and the international legal system.

227. Indeed, such empirical research into reputation has occurred in the
field of transnational corruption and bribery, where reputation is established
through surveys of those directly involved in the transactions at issue. See
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2003, at
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2003/cpi2003.en.html. Published annually,
Transparency International’s research is invariably surprising in its ability to
show that the incidence of bribery among countries is not always what one
would expect. Id. A perfect example is the relative position of the United
States and Chile (positions: 18th and 20th least corrupt, respectively), or Italy
and Kuwait (tied at 35th least corrupt) or that Hong Kong is considered less
corrupt than the United States. Id.

